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Public-private partnership (PPP) concession agreements are awarded by National,
State and local public agencies that contract with private companies to finance and
deliver infrastructure as a long term service to governments and their citizens, rather
than having the private firms design and build infrastructure assets to be financed,
operated—and, hopefully, maintained—by government. PPPs are similar to the
emerging model of selling business or personal software as a cloud-based service (SaaS)
rather than as a product licensed by the user—a model that that has transformed and
disrupted the enterprise software industry. Australia is a world leader in PPP infrastructure
delivery, and has had over two decades of experience in delivering civil and social
infrastructure services to its citizens via PPP concessions. Along the way, the public and
private participants in infrastructure PPPs have developed practices and a mature
institutional framework necessary for this kind of long-term, risky public-private
commercial partnership. This study reports the findings from in-depth interviews with
25 senior executives of public and private participants in PPP infrastructure projects
from the three Eastern Australian States with the longest history of PPP delivery. Based
on the results of those interviews, we develop a governance model for infrastructure
service delivery: the government selects infrastructure projects, guided by a non-
partisan, expert infrastructure prioritization panel, and contracts for the delivery of these
prioritized infrastructure services with a private concessionaire financed by long-term
institutional investment capital. The concessionaire is a private entity in charge of
financing, designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure service.
The government supervises the infrastructure service, to safeguard public interest. The
government also provides an institutional framework, with contracts and authorities
necessary for the interaction between the public and private actors.
Keywords: Alignment of interest, Conflict of interest, Governance, Infrastructure,
Institutional investor, Investment bank, Public-private partnership, PPP, P3, Pension fund,
Pension fund aggregator, Infrastructure developer, Structured finance, Relational
contracting, risk allocationIntroduction
A great deal has been written about the pros and cons of delivering civil and social
infrastructure services via public-private partnership (PPP) concessions (Tang et al.,
2010), but much less about the governance challenges arising from potential conflicts
of interest between the various public and private parties within different phases of2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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PPPs involve planning and selecting which infrastructure elements to develop, a very
different phase from the infrastructure design and construction phase, which, in turn,
is very different from the operations and maintenance phase. In PPP infrastructure ser-
vice delivery, the public and private sectors both need to be governed for coordinated
and aligned work over these very different lifecycle phases. The governance challenge is
that the goals and practices of public and private sectors differ significantly; at the same
time the set of participants changes across the lifecycle phases (South et al., 2015). The
public sector focuses on how the system surrounding the infrastructure service leads to
distribution of public utility, whereas the private sector takes the public utility as a
given, and focuses on how to deliver the service as efficiently as possible, and make
financial gains (Tang et al. 2010; Ruf ín & Rivera-Santos 2012; Liu et al. 2014; Kwak
et al. 2009).
This paper summarizes insights about PPP governance challenges and the lessons
learned from more than two decades of experience with alternative governance
approaches confronting economically, environmentally and socially sustainable selec-
tion, investment and delivery of infrastructure in three Eastern Australia States
(Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland). We chose to study Australia, because it
is one of the most experienced countries with respect to governance of PPP infrastruc-
ture service delivery. We discuss and draw insights about the following four areas of
governance:
(1)Prioritization of Federal and State funds to address the wish-list of infrastructure needs
and desires of all regional and sectoral claimants for new or enhanced infrastructure
services;
(2)The procurement process to short-list and select concession companies, termed
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to deliver PPP projects;
(3)Internal decisions of the SPV board and its key executives over the lifecycle of the
concession; and
(4)Contracts between the SPV and its construction and operations contractors.
These empirical observations of current practice suggest that public utility,
institutions, and coordination issues are of importance for PPP infrastructure
service, and lead us to form a governance model for infrastructure service
delivery.
Research methodology and approach
The insights presented in this paper are derived from a set of semi-structured interviews
that the first author conducted with more than 20 senior executives drawn from key
participants in PPP investment and delivery — governmental PPP bodies and infrastruc-
ture agencies, pension funds and aggregators of pension funds, infrastructure developers,
investment banks, investment arms of construction firms, lawyers and bankers — over a
2-week period during December 2015 in three Australian States: Victoria, New South
Wales and Queensland. To encourage free-flowing, candid discussion, interviews were
not recorded. Extensive notes were taken, coded, redacted and analyzed. The insights
about ways to mitigate the significant governance challenges of PPP delivery that have
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set of focused research questions for academics to explore in greater depth, and provide
high-level guidance to federal and state agencies in countries like the US that have had far
less experience delivering infrastructure services via PPP concessions.Key findings from interviews
National infrastructure need prioritization
Australia’s national Parliament has created an infrastructure agency to help it
develop a prioritized list of national infrastructure needs. The agency is called
‘Infrastructure Australia’, and it has a mandate to prioritize and advance nationally
significant infrastructure, and to advise government at national and state levels. Like
similar agencies created in the UK and elsewhere, a group like this provides some
influence over which regional or sectoral projects will receive national funding, but
it is challenging to insulate this kind of professional bureaucracy from high level
political pressures when the party in power in the government changes, or when
new projects that were not previously prioritized are proposed by state, municipal
or regional governments, or presented as unsolicited proposals by private infrastruc-
ture concessionaires.
The Australian government uses “Value for Money (VfM)” analysis as an important
evaluation tool in the infrastructure needs prioritization. The VfM calculates the total
expected costs for construction, operation and maintenance of an infrastructure asset
over its lifecycle. The calculations are done for public financing and private financing,
and then the two are compared. In this comparison, public financing bears lower inter-
est rates than private financing in most developed countries that have sound credit
ratings. So, in order for the PPP alternative to be selected, the savings to the public
through greater efficiency and quality of design, construction, operation and mainten-
ance, as well as from the expected value of the risks of construction cost overruns and
user demand shortfalls that the government can shift to the SPV under a PPP conces-
sion regime, must exceed the PPP’s higher financing and transaction costs.
The application of this VfM process has been criticized in Australia because of the
difficulty entailed in capturing the full cost of public financing and public procurement
and supervision of design and construction. Moreover, public maintenance is seldom
provided at the same level of quality as what is required in PPP agreements. Thirdly,
determining the expected value of risk transfer for construction cost overruns and user
demand shortfalls requires considerable judgment.State-level governance issues
Three Australian State governments—Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales—have
established independent statutory bodies to prioritize statewide infrastructure needs; legis-
lators will still make the final calls on funding projects but cannot easily ignore these
priorities to favor regional or other special interests. To the extent that these agencies
publish and widely disseminate their prioritized lists of statewide projects, it becomes
increasingly difficult for the legislature to ignore their rationally prioritized projects and
justify to the public investing in a lower priority project, or one that has not previously
been considered.
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negotiation between the government and the SPV rather than an open call for pro-
posals based on a project’s “uniqueness.” These proposals have only occasionally been
accepted; and virtually all of the handful that have been accepted thus far involve
expansion of the scope of existing assets. The perceived difficulty in managing the
interface between the entrenched concessionaire and a new concessionaire whose
construction or operations might interfere with the existing concessionaire’s operations
has been the main justification for claiming “uniqueness” that has been accepted thus
far as a basis for sole source unsolicited proposals. This “uniqueness” criterion clearly
runs the risk of increasing the concentration of ownership of infrastructure concessions
in a given sector by expanding the number and scope of facilities already being oper-
ated by existing P3 concessionaires—in the Australian toll road concession sector,
Transurban™ is already a dominant player in Australia, and has had sole-source expan-
sions of its existing concessions approved.SPV governance issues
Governmental infrastructure agencies in all three States covered by this study stated
that they were not concerned about internal SPV governance issues and so did not
typically review SPV shareholder agreements. They believed that their concession
contracts with the SPVs, which had fixed “availability payments”—roughly equivalent to
asset lease payments by the government in lieu of, or in addition to, tolls or other user
fees that the SPV would collect— and penalties for violations of operational perform-
ance requirements, placed these governance risks squarely on the SPV’s owners and
lenders, and thus insulated the government and public from harm due to any conflicts
of interest internal to the SPV.
The interviews reveal that there is one exception, however. The longer the equity
investment will be held by SPV concessionaires, the more closely their goals become
aligned with the public sector agency’s goals for long term, low cost, high-quality deliv-
ery of infrastructure services to its citizens, and hence the fewer real or implied
conflicts of interest are likely to arise. From this point of view, pension funds, pension
aggregators, sovereign wealth funds and others are the ideal majority investors in infra-
structure concessions, provided that they can access the necessary design, construction
and operations expertise to bid competitively and realistically and to manage these
infrastructure services well over their lifecycle. Some of the earliest Australian PPP road
concessions were set up to be repaid entirely by SPV toll revenues. Investment Banks
acted as the initial SPV equity investors and garnered significant management fees for
packaging the projects and winning the bids —based, in large part, on using more
optimistic user demand forecasts than other bidders. They then sold all of their equity
via an IPO immediately or shortly after financial close, prior to the start of construc-
tion. Some of these listed shares lost much or all of their value when the demand fore-
casts in the SPV proposals turned out to have been highly optimistic. Partly as a result
of this experience, Australian government agencies now typically exert some control
over the identity and ownership structure of their counterparty to the SPV agreement
across the project lifecycle, although not over its internal governance. Australian SPV
concession agreements now typically contain a number of constraints on a “change of
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project phases to avoid equity participants selling out their stakes unknown others too
soon in the concession term without the agency’s knowledge or consent. Violation of
these concession terms would constitute a serious breach of contract by the SPV and
no interviewees reported any such breaches.
The PPP investment arms of design-construction contractors typically have heavily
overlapping ownership with the PPP contractors—often 100 % common ownership
(Bing et al. 2005). They are typically not long-term asset holders, typically seeking to
exit as soon as possible after construction has been completed. Moreover, equity
participation in the PPP concession can generate conflicts of interest between construc-
tion profits vs. infrastructure returns that pose risks to other purely financial equity
investors, lenders and the public. One approach that has been proposed to address this
conflict, while still bringing the requisite expertise into the concession, is to create
well-aligned investment platforms for investing in multiple infrastructure concessions
comprised of engineers, contractors, operators and long-term, institutional investors
such as pension funds, in which the long-term investors would hold long-term majority
equity stakes in the concessions and the contractors would be given the opportunity to
bid on the concessions but would not be guaranteed the award of the contracts.
When Design-Construct (D-C) contractors or infrastructure operators (collectively
termed “Industrial Investors”) hold large enough minority equity stakes to give them SPV
Board representation in SPVs in which there are also pure “Financial” equity investors
such as pension fund aggregators like QIC, pension funds like Hostplus or infrastructure
development and investment funds that are not majority owned by Industrial partners,
shareholder agreements generally require the D-C or operations contractors’ nominated
directors to recuse themselves from voting on board resolutions involving construction
cost or time extensions, operating issues or similar SPV Board of Directors’ matters in
which they are “interested parties.” Some financial investors go further and assert that
directors nominated by D-C or operations partners or their firms’ investment arms should
be excused from the meeting and should not even participate in board-level discussions
on matters in which their holding company’s construction or operations arm is an “inter-
ested party.”
In some cases, executives from the infrastructure finance arms of construction firms
argue that their firms are truly independent business entities, that they are personally,
organizationally and individually independent of their parent company’s construction
arms, and they are incentivized based on their investment arm’s long-range financial
returns not on the profits of their sister companies’ construction arms. In addition,
some of them state that they have developed a history of holding infrastructure invest-
ments far into the operating concession phase, so that their goals are very well aligned
with the goals of the financial investors. These firms have sometimes been able to
establish sufficient trust with the purely financial investors to have these conflict of
interest recusal clauses for Industrial directors in the SPV shareholder agreements
waived when their parent firm’s construction or operations subsidiary holds the D-C
contract for the SPV.
Australia has very strong fiduciary requirements in its corporation laws that require
corporate directors to act strictly in the interests of the companies on whose boards
they serve—in this case the SPV’s board rather than the SPV directors’ previous or
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Auditors’ across the phases of tendering, SPV selection, financial and commercial close,
design-construction and operations to assure good governance of the SPV companies.
Nevertheless, when delivery partners or their investment arms hold enough SPV equity
to gain one or more seats on the SPV Board, a virtually unanimous opinion among all of
the executives interviewed in this study is that appointing an experienced Independent
Board Chairperson with no ties to either the Financial or Industrial partner companies in
the SPV. This has proven to be allow the SPV to access the delivery partners' deep design,
construction or operations expertise for the benefit, while providing good governance to
address material conflicts of interest when they arise, and keeping contentious board-level
discussions on track. Several experienced Australian senior executives now make a career
out of serving as independent board chairs, independent board members and senior
executives in concession SPVs.SPV-design-constructor agreement issues
In their PPP concession agreements with the government, SPVs typically agree to very
strict limits on making any claims for additional payments from the government for
construction cost or time overruns. The concession agreements typically even disallow
claims for extra time or cost due to differing site condition, or worse than average
weather, with exceptions only for a limited and very specific set of force majeure defini-
tions such as storms or floods larger than the 100-year return period. These concession
agreement terms are then passed down to the SPV’s design, construction and opera-
tions contractors to prevent construction or operations claims from impairing the
SPV’s equity, potentially triggering debt defaults or renegotiations due to violations of
loan covenants. In fact, part of the due diligence process by lenders involves a “gap
analysis” of any differences in contract terms at the two levels— government to conces-
sion vs. concession to contractor—that could impair the SPV’s equity. Tough, firm,
fixed-price contracts that set very tight conditions in the contract between the SPV and
the design-constructor for making construction claims also simplifies or eliminates
many potentially conflictual governance issues within SPVs owned by both Industrial
and Financial equity investors.Institutional Investors’ internal governance issues
Pension funds have historically not been direct investors in new, “greenfield” infrastruc-
ture projects—with a small number of notable exceptions such as the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension fund. Traditionally pensions have required extensive internal com-
mittee review and approval of significant financial commitments in, or changes to, their
investments. The same has been true for some of the pension aggregators, with internal
committees that can create delays for urgent decisions that need to be made by the
SPV Boards. This made them unattractive partners to infrastructure developers and
builders who are able to delegate more decision-making authority to their SPV direc-
tors and managers. Increasingly, Australian aggregators of pension funds wanting to
invest in greenfield infrastructure assets have been acquiring and/or developing signifi-
cant internal capacity and/or relationships with external advisors that allow them to
invest directly in the equity of greenfield infrastructure assets. The most experienced
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to appoint board representatives in the SPV’s who are authorized to make substantial
financial commitments and decisions without prior approval from their own or the
participating pensions’ investment review committees or boards. This makes them
more attractive SPV partners in greenfield infrastructure projects for the more sophisti-
cated investment funds and other participants in SPV equity.
The Australian model for PPP infrastructure service delivery
The description of practices and models used for PPP infrastructure service delivery in
Australia shows that private and public actors there have developed working practices
and models for infrastructure service delivery that address many of the key governance
challenges. The Australian experience shows the benefits of having professional
national and state-level infrastructure units that are independent of the legislatures
prioritize national infrastructure needs. The model for national needs prioritization is
that parliament has created an agency that provides analysis of national infrastructure
needs, and advises government at all levels on its prioritization. Government ultimately
decides which infrastructure assets to develop, guided by these priorities, and uses
rigorous Value-for-Money analyses to select the delivery approach used to finance and
develop the selected infrastructure assets. In the Australian case, coordination over the
different lifecycle phases of an infrastructure asset is also increasingly being governed
by stipulating that the SPV concession must be owned and governed by its initial inves-
tors for an extended time period, including design, construction and a ramp-up period
of several years of operation and maintenance. The division of responsibilities of private
actors and the public is governed in an elaborate and precise performance contract that
stipulates the responsibilities of the private actors in operation and maintenance of the
asset. Thereby, the government can use contract enforcement to achieve the desired
infrastructure service for the public.
The Australian case shows that the relationship between private investors and
private infrastructure service providers can be made clear and can be governed so
that long term stewardship of the asset is promoted. The mature set of governance
arrangements that they have evolved significantly mitigate the problems of changes
in the active participants and their conflicting sets of interests across lifecycle
phases, since the long term operating responsibility for the concession increasingly
bridges over the incentive-incompatibility of a conventional publicly financed,
design-bid-build process across the successive phases of the provisioning and use
of infrastructure services (Henisz et al., 2012).
Conclusions
The Australian PPP experience over almost three decades now points to a future
model for infrastructure service delivery. In such a model, the government selects
infrastructure projects, guided by a non-partisan, expert infrastructure
prioritization panel, and contracts for the delivery of these prioritized infrastruc-
ture services with a private concessionaire financed by long-term institutional
investment capital. The concessionaire is a private entity in charge of financing,
designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure service. The
government supervises the infrastructure service performance levels at arm’s
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work, with contracts and authorities necessary for the institutional governance of the
relationship between private and public actors. We call this model the PPP “infrastructure
as a service” delivery model. Future research should study this model, and seek to under-
stand the contractual and relational governance arrangements needed for coordinating
participants and resources for more efficient and sustainable infrastructure service
delivery to citizens worldwide.
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